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Abstract 
Previous studies have concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) has 
not been successful in controlling the outcomes of the auditor-client relationship. 
Additionally, the literature concludes that high institutional ownership enhances audit 
quality through monitoring the management-auditor relationship. This paper hypothesizes 
that better corporate governance in terms of high institutional ownership percentage will 
enhance audit quality during a MAFR regime. Since countries that have implemented 
MAFR in the past have their data in their local languages, I use the special case of Arthur 
Andersen clients based in the US as my treatment group. I carry out a descriptive 
statistical analysis and run linear OLS regressions with discretionary accruals as a proxy 
for audit quality as my dependent variable. Results suggest that the percentage of 
institutional ownership does not have a significant impact on audit quality in a MAFR 
regime. 
Keywords: MAFR, institutional ownership, audit, discretionary accruals. 
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I. Introduction 
On April 1st, 2017 the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) rule was 
officially adopted in India. This new section of the companies act demands that all public 
companies and certain private companies with few exceptions have to change their audit 
firms after two consecutive 5-year terms. In the past, the EU, Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Italy and South Korea have implemented MAFR with the objective of achieving auditor 
independence. However, studies that used Italy and Brazil as a case study concluded that 
MAFR has a negative effect on audit quality and it unnecessarily increases administrative 
costs for both the client and the audit firm (Aslan 2011). Despite the results from these 
case studies, India has implemented MAFR in response to the huge Satyam Scandal of 
2009 where PWC helped this computer software company to manipulate its books of 
accounts to the tune of Rs.50.4 billion (Choudhary 2018).  
After the announcement of MAFR in India, all the Big 4 audit firms and a few 
mid-tier firms set up special audit rotation departments. Therefore, the costs of 
implementing MAFR has added a burden onto the audit firms. Moreover, the objective of 
auditor independence is not achieved because management and auditors already know 
that their relationship is short-term, so they have no incentive to maintain it and thus 
reduces audit quality (Aslan 2011). If there are studies suggesting that MAFR is not 
successful in enhancing audit quality, then why is India doing it? Moreover, in the past, 
all countries that have implemented MAFR have implemented it on firms with certain 
capital and borrowing requirements or certain types of institutions. For example, in India, 
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only those unlisted public companies having a paid-up share capital of INR 10 crores are 
eligible for MAFR (Sriram 2015). Similarly, companies in Italy were eligible for MAFR 
only if they were a listed company and a public interest company (Ewelt-Knauer, Gold 
and Pott 2012). Since none of the works of literature have mentioned companies being 
eligible for MAFR based on good corporate governance structures in place, I decided to 
do to explore this topic.  
Previous studies have shown that good corporate governance mechanisms can 
ensure auditor independence (Klein 2002). If a firm has a high institutional ownership 
percentage, then they have greater control over management and therefore, can oversee 
and monitor management and accounting decisions (Mitra, Hossain and Deis 2007). 
Moreover, the institutional investors can monitor the auditing process to ensure a high-
quality audit. Additionally, greater the institutional owners, greater is the demand for 
accountability because more of their money is invested in the company so any fraud or 
hurting of reputation to the firm could cause great damage to them (Mitra, Hossain and 
Deis 2007). Therefore, institutional owners that have a large share in the company 
monitor auditor-management relationship and ensure auditor independence. Since the 
flaw of the MAFR regime is that it fails to control the outcomes of the auditor-client 
relationship, then implementing the regime on companies that already have good 
corporate governance in place that ensures monitoring will enhance audit quality and its 
benefits will outweigh is costs (Aslan 2011). My hypothesis, hence is that better 
corporate governance in terms of a high institutional ownership percentage will enhance 
the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality.   
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I look at the special case of Arthur Andersen (AA) clients as my mandatory audit 
firm rotation scenario. The failure of AA in 2001, after being involved in scams like 
Worldcom and Enron, forced its clients to change auditors. Even though these AA clients 
had to change auditors, they didn’t have to change auditors in the future, so this is not a 
true MAFR scenario. However, this scenario does help me analyze the effect of forced 
auditor change in ways which have not been done before. I use these AA clients and 
compare it to those firms that voluntarily switched auditors in 2001. I carry out a linear 
regression with five years of pre-rotation (1996-2000) data and five years of post-rotation 
(2002-2006) data with scenarios of high institutional owners and low institutional owners 
to test for the effect on audit quality. I use discretionary accruals as my proxy for audit 
quality and carry out my regressions with independent variables such as whether the firm 
is subjected to MAFR or volunteer rotation, pre and post 2001, and an interacting term 
combining these two independent variables. I run four different variations of this 
regression model to test for improvements in audit quality by comparing MAFR vs non-
MAFR countries in the pre and post 2001 period while separating them based on high 
and low institutional ownership percentages.  
After running my OLS linear regressions, I find that MAFR does not have a 
significant effect on audit quality for both the high institutional ownership firms and low 
institutional ownership firms. Therefore, I do not find any evidence that stronger 
corporate governance enhances the effectiveness of MAFR.  
The reason for carrying out this research is to find conditions that could be helpful 
in selecting firms that should be subjected to a MAFR regime in order to enhance audit 
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quality. This study is different and adds to the existing literature about the MAFR regime 
in that we have no evidence that high institutional ownership as a proxy for good 
corporate governance enhances audit quality during a MAFR regime. Hence this study is 
useful for regulators to know that corporate governance should not be a requirement for a 
company being eligible for a MAFR regime. The takeaway for investors from this study 
is that they should still heavily regulate the auditing process of their company, regardless 
of whether the firm is subjected to MAFR or not to ensure high-quality audit.  
This paper is organized as follows with section two reviewing the literature and 
hypothesis development. Then section three and section four I talk about the data and 
methodology. Next section five discusses the results and limitations of the study and then 
section six mentions the concluding remarks.  
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Accounting scandals around the world in recent history have raised questions 
about audit quality and consequently audit quality has gained much importance over the 
years. Audit quality has no single definition, but instead is a multi-faceted concept. It can 
be defined as “the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both detect a 
breach in the client’s accounting system and report the breach” (DeAngelo 1981). 
However, the definition is broader than this since the auditor’s job is not only to check 
whether financial statements are in accordance to GAAP, but also to check how true the 
financial statements are reflective of the company’s health (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
This raises the question of high-quality audit and how to achieve it. Past studies 
have shown how audit quality is affected by audit fees (Hoitash, Markelevich and 
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Barragato 2007). Additionally, audit firm size (Lennox, 1999) and Big N auditors 
(Vanstraelen 2000) affect audit quality. Other variables affecting audit quality are audit 
tenure (Carcello and Nagy 2004), corporate governance and litigations against auditors 
(Lennox 1999). In the past few years, there has been a debate on whether Mandatory 
Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) enhances audit quality or not (Aslan, 2011; Jackson, 
Moldrich, Roebuck 2008). Many countries like Brazil, Italy, South Korea and very 
recently India have adopted MAFR in the past. However, after analyzing countries that 
have implemented MAFR there has been conflicting conclusions on the impact of it on 
audit quality.  
MAFR in theory can improve audit quality by improving auditor independence at 
least in perception. In a study conducted by Bronson, Harris and Whisenant (2016) they 
conclude that after adopting MAFR the client experiences less earnings smoothing, more 
timely recognition of losses and therefore enhancement of audit quality. MAFR does this 
by promoting auditor independence as the firm tenure is only for a fixed short period of 
time, in which the auditor-client relationship cannot develop a strong bond. The level of 
perceived auditor independence is also important in the argument for MAFR. For 
example, Titman and Trueman (1986) provide a model in which perceived audit quality 
positively impacts the value of an initial public offering. Therefore, auditor independence 
even in perception is important. Dopuch, King, and Schwartz (2001) find that MAFR 
leads to less bias in audit reports. MAFR might also be the answer to better audit quality 
because over time auditors might become stale and find the audit engagements as 
repetitive. Their disengagement cultivates a tendency to anticipate results rather than pay 
attention to small and subtle changes, thus resulting in auditor’s response being affected 
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by subjective judgments made by management and previous auditors (Arel, Brody and 
Kurt 2005).  Additionally, the most convincing argument is that with MAFR in place the 
auditors do not feel the pressure to please the client because rotation will occur on a 
regular basis, and instead the auditors would be compelled to report accurately as they 
have the fear of being caught by the firm that takes over next (Arel, Brody and Kurt 
2005).  
At the same time, other researchers have concluded that costs of MAFR and the 
disadvantages outweigh its benefits. For large firms as well, the costs will be high with an 
additional rotation department, IT costs, processing costs, and training costs and loss of 
efficiencies when the audit and management team start to interact (Breeden 2012). Aslan 
(2011) uses Italy and Spain as case studies and concludes that MAFR decreases audit 
quality and completion in the audit market. This study reveals that the issue of auditor 
independence in actuality is not solved by MAFR and the cost of MAFR is not justified 
(Aslan 2011). Only perceived auditor independence increases. MAFR disincentives 
smaller audit firms to invest in themselves because they cannot compete with bigger audit 
firms to gain clients (Aslan 2011). Other papers like the one by Cameran, Francis, Marra 
and Pettinicchio (2015) also use Italy as a case study and reveal that since rotation is 
costly and audit quality improves with auditor tenure, this case does not support MAFR.  
After accounting scandals like Enron and Worldcom, SOX imposed new 
restrictions on corporate governance for companies. For example, independent audit 
committees are a requirement. Board size and its composition, audit committee and its 
requirements and the ownership structure of a firm in terms of institutional ownership are 
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all part of corporate governance and impact audit quality individually and together. These 
restrictions encourage more independent auditor-client relationships by a closer 
monitoring on management by these independent members. Okaro, Okafor, and Okoye 
(2015) find that board size had a negative and significant impact on audit quality. 
Additionally, board independence in terms of fewer executives residing on the board and 
abnormal accruals have found to have a negative association (Klein 2002). This is an 
indication that a less independent board committee, would propel auditors to engage in 
earnings management and hence abnormal accruals would be higher. If a firm engages in 
earnings management then its financial reports do not reflect the firm’s true position and 
audit quality is not at par. Therefore, different measures of corporate governance enhance 
audit quality.  
In this paper, I will be focusing on corporate governance in terms of institutional 
ownership percentage. Previous literature about institutional ownership percentage in 
playing a role as a good corporate governance measure mentions that a high institutional 
ownership percentage ensures shareholders are actively monitoring and influencing 
management’s accounting policies and the functions of the company (Mitra, Hossain and 
Deis 2007). Institutional ownership is measured as the fraction of a company’s shares 
held by institutional owners that include pension funds, endowments, hedge funds, 
mutual funds and commercial banks. The shares held by institutional owners is usually 
greater than that of individual investors and therefore, they have more power than 
individual investors (Zureigat 2011). Sharma (2004) concluded that as the percentage of 
independent institutional ownership increases the likelihood of frauds decreases. At the 
Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on Institutional Investors and Corporate 
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governance in 1999 it was mentioned how a larger ownership stake in a corporation 
increases the motivation for institutions to oversee management operations that would 
result in closer monitoring of the auditing process (Mitra, Hossain and Deis 2007). It is in 
the best interest of the shareholders for financial statements to be audited well, so they 
put a constraint on the accounting flexibility to supply false audited reports (Mitra, 
Hossain and Deis 2007).  Additionally, Warfield, Wild and Wild (1994) conclude that 
managers tend to be biased and their accounting choices are influenced by their bias, and 
hence magnitude of discretionary accruals is significantly lower when manager 
ownership is high. Another theory as to why institutional ownership enhances corporate 
governance and in turn leads to greater audit quality is because sophisticated institutional 
owners want to pay for high-quality audits as a safeguard against fraudulent reporting 
(Mitra, Hossain and Deis 2007). To conclude, previous studies reveal how institutional 
ownership enhances audit quality by being a strong proxy for corporate governance.   
One of the drawbacks of MAFR, as stated by different papers that have analyzed 
the impact of MAFR on audit quality, is auditor independence in terms of the outcomes 
of auditor-client relationship is not regulated even after MAFR is implemented (Aslan 
2011).The reason for this is that management is less incentivized to worry about the 
outcomes of relationship with the auditor because of the shorter and fixed auditor tenure. 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC) (2007) mentions in their article called “Mandatory 
Rotation of Audit Firms” that MAFR does not actually lead to auditor independence as 
there are other ways like corporate governance measures, control standard (e.g. peer 
review) and other market forces (e.g. litigation) that do it. MAFR may increase auditor 
independence in appearance, however, not in actuality because the MAFR information is 
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public. Hence on paper, auditor independence seems to have increased, but in practice, 
nothing has changed. (Ewelt-Knauer, Gold and Pott 2013). Consequently, the costs of 
implementing MAFR are not worth it because auditor-client relationships are still close, 
and audits can be reported falsely. However, companies that have high institutional 
ownership are already invested in monitoring management, overseeing the audit process 
and promoting auditor independence. To conclude, if high institutional ownership firms 
implement MAFR then auditor independence in terms of the auditor maintaining an 
unbiased relationship with the management is already taken care of by the institutional 
owners and MAFR can further enhance audit quality. Whereas firms with low 
institutional ownership suffer from poor management oversight. The drawback of the 
MAFR regime is auditor independence, yet this will not be solved even when MAFR is 
implemented on firms with low institutional ownership and audit quality will not be 
improved. Hence firms with high institutional ownership would be able to enhance audit 
quality during a MAFR regime by tackling the auditor independence flaw.  
III. Data  
MAFR has been implemented in countries such as Italy, Brazil, etc. Their data is 
recorded in their regional language, which would be time consuming and costly to 
decipher and translate into English. Blouin, Grein and Rountree (2007) use former Arthur 
Andersen clients to analyze forced auditor change. Inspired by them, I am testing my 
hypothesis of MAFR using a special case of Arthur Andersen (AA) clients based in the 
US. These clients were forced to switch auditors in 2001 due to the collapse of AA in the 
wake of the Enron accounting scandal.  
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I collect all my data from Compustat and restrict my sample to only those clients 
that switched to a Big 4 auditor (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG, and 
Ernst&Young) for homogeneity purposes. Subsequently, I distinguish between MAFR 
clients as those that switched auditors from AA in 2001 and volunteer clients as those 
that switched from non-AA audit firms. For many firms that were originally in my 
sample, data regarding institutional ownership percentage or discretionary accruals were 
missing pre-2001.Therefore, along with missing data problems and using the constraint 
of Big 4 audit firm switch, I narrow my MAFR scenario from 105 firms to 46 firms and 
for the non-MAFR scenario from 220 firms to 68 firms. While I collect data from 1996-
2006, I exclude 2001 as that was the year the auditor switch happened. Most MAFR 
periods are 10 years (for example, India has a 10-year rotation period). However, I am 
restricted to a 5-year period because of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as that would 
potentially skew my results. Additionally, to test the effect of MAFR on audit quality, I 
take data of the pre-switch and the post-switch periods and compare them.  
I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality as it is the most commonly 
used proxy (Bing et.al 2014). Discretionary accruals are those portions of accruals that 
cannot reflect economic performance. They are also a popular tool used by managers to 
manipulate earnings. Since earnings management is inversely related to audit quality, and 
discretionary accruals are positively related to earnings management, then ceteris paribus, 
higher the discretionary accruals suggest lower audit quality (Bing et al. 2014). Elshafie 
and Nyadroh (2014) conclude that discretionary accruals have a significant association 
with restatements of financial statements, Big 4 audits and issuing a negative internal 
control report in the positive direction. This means that Big 4 audits have lower 
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discretionary accruals, which is another reason why I limit my sample to solely Big 4 
auditors. Additionally, according to Lawrence et al. (2011), discretionary accruals can 
directly indicate the auditor’s efforts to force accounting standards by spotting earnings 
management.  
The independent variables include the percentage of institutional ownership of a 
company, the size of the firm and whether or not the audit firm is an industry expert. I 
find the data for percentage of institutional ownership directly on Thomson Reuters and 
the rest on Compustat. As mentioned in existing literature, the greater the percentage of 
institutional ownership, the greater is the monitoring process, which in turn leads to 
auditor independence. In turn, auditor independence leads to better audit quality (Lin and 
Tepalagul 2014). There is strong evidence that suggests the industry expertise of the 
auditor can be used as an audit quality proxy (Bing et al. 2014). Krishnan (2003) 
mentioned that auditors with expertise are associated with less earnings management and 
therefore better audit quality. For example, an audit firm that specializes in the banking 
sector will know how banking balance sheets are recorded and it would be easier for that 
auditor to spot abnormalities. Additionally, I believe that using other common proxy 
measures of audit quality variables such as audit fees and total revenue of audit firms as 
my control variables would be helpful. However, that was not a possibility because of 
missing data. I use the size of the firm as one of my variables to consider differences in 
larger and smaller firms. Besides, the literature states that smaller firms engage in more 
earnings manipulation in that they engage in more manipulation of discretionary accruals 
to avoid reporting losses (Kim, Liu and Rhee 2003). Finally, all these variables help me 
to conduct robust tests, which I further explain in my next section. 
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IV. Methodology 
In order to test the impact of the MAFR regime on audit quality with firms of high 
and low institutional ownership percentage in place, I run a simple descriptive statistical 
analysis. This involves taking the mean, median and standard deviation of discretionary 
accruals, the industry expert variable and the size variable. I calculate this for the low and 
high institutional ownership case, MAFR vs. volunteer firms and the post and pre-period. 
In order to test for significance, I find the difference in means (p-value) between all these 
cases.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
To further carry out my research, I run simple OLS linear regressions. I create 
several dummy variables in order for my regression to make sense. I include a POST 
variable that is equal to one for years after 2001 and zero for years before 2001. I include 
a variable called MAFR equal to one for clients that were forced to switch from AA in 
2001 and zero for those that voluntarily switched. I then interact these terms to test the 
incremental impact of MAFR on audit quality after the auditor change and name it 
MAFR*POST. After matching industry expertise with the actual auditor of the client, I 
create another variable called industryexpertornot that indicates a one value if the auditor 
is the same as the industry expertise auditor and a zero value if it is not. I take the natural 
log of total assets of each firm to control for the size effect as previous studies have done 
(Dang, Li and Yang 2018). I name this variable totalassets_log. My hypothesis revolves 
around institutional ownership and so I divided high and low institutional ownership 
based on two scenarios in 2001, the year of the switch. One is based on the median value 
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(0.0436) of institutional ownership in the year 2001 and so any value above (below) is 
assigned to the high (low) institutional ownership category. The other scenario entails 
assigning firms based on whether they have any institutional owners in 2001.  
My primary regression models include discretionary accruals (DACC_2) as the 
dependent variable and my independent variables are MAFR, POST, MAFR*POST, 
industryexpertornot and totalassets_log. Additionally, I carry out another set of 
regressions without the two control variables-industryexpertornot and totalassets_log.  I 
use these two models in four scenarios to run simple OLS linear regressions that help me 
distinguish high institutional ownership percentage firms with low institutional 
ownership percentage firms.  
1) 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 +
𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
With this regression model in mind, the betas of MAFR, POST, 
industryexpertornot and totalassets_ln should be negative. The interacting term’s 
(MAFR*POST) beta should be negative, but it should also be significant in the high 
institutional ownership case. If my results replicate this, then there is evidence consistent 
with my hypothesis that high institutional ownership percentage firms enhance audit 
quality during a MAFR regime. The next section highlights the descriptive and regression 
analyses.  
V. Results, Discussion and Limitations 
After running the descriptive statistical analysis, I find that for the post period 
between MAFR vs non-MAFR firms in the low institutional ownership case the 
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difference in the means for discretionary accruals is significant (0.00384). In contrast, for 
the high institutional ownership case it is not significant (0.128). This goes against my 
hypothesis as discretionary accruals should be significant in the post MAFR period for 
the high institutional ownership scenario for it to have an impact on audit quality. The 
size variable (0.0325) and the industry expert variable (1.719E-156) are both significant 
for MAFR vs non-MAFR in the high institutional ownership case.  
In my primary regression models that include my two control variables, the cases 
based on median value, exhibit a MAFR*POST that has a negative correlation with 
discretionary accruals with a coefficient of -0.0149 in the low case and -0.0236 in the 
high case. MAFR*POST has a non-significant p-value in the low case (0.541) as well as 
in the high case (0.349). In the scenario based on zero as the dividing point, 
MAFR*POST continues to have a negative correlation with discretionary accruals and the 
coefficients are -0.0244 for the low case and -0.028 for the high case. The associating p- 
values are also not significant with 0.253 for the low case and 0.328 for the high case. 
The coefficient of totalassets_log in all four instances (high and low based on median and 
high and low based on zero) has a negative correlation with discretionary accruals, and 
the coefficient of industryexpertornot positively correlates to discretionary. This is 
consistent with previous studies that conclude industry expert auditor as a proxy for audit 
quality (Bing et.al 2014) and size as a control for discretionary accruals (Kim, Liu and 
Rhee 2003).   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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In the case based on the median value of low institutional ownership in Column 1 
and (-0.0233) in high institutional ownership case in Colum 2, I find that that the focus 
term (MAFR*POST) has a negative association with discretionary accruals (-0.0139) 
when the regression models that do not include the control variables are used. The p- 
values for the interaction term in both cases are not significant. Additionally, when I 
carry out the regression using high and low institutional ownership percentage based on 
zero, MAFR*POST still has a negative correlation with discretionary accruals (-0.025 in 
the low case and -0.028 in the high case). MAFR*POST is still not significant in the high 
and low scenario using zero as the dividing point with a p-value of 0.241 for the low case 
and 0.318 for the high case.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
My hypothesis states that a higher percentage of institutional ownership during a 
MAFR regime will enhance audit quality. To provide evidence for the hypothesis, the 
MAFR*POST variable would have to be significant and negative in all the high 
institutional ownership percentage cases. However, in all my regression scenarios this 
variable is not significant, thereby rejecting my hypothesis. There is existing literature 
that mentions how MAFR increases audit quality in those audit markets in which MAFR 
has been implemented (Bronson, Harris and Whisenant 2016). Additionally, firms with 
greater institutional ownership have also indicated better quality audits (Zureigat 2011). 
Therefore, it only makes sense that firms with a high institutional ownership percentage 
in a MAFR regime would have higher audit quality. However, my results do not support 
this hypothesis. In fact, audit quality and discretionary accruals are inversely related. 
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Therefore, lower the discretionary accruals, better is the audit quality. Although the 
MAFR*POST variable does have a negative coefficient attached to it through all the 
regression combinations, I cannot be sure of its impact on audit quality because is it not 
significant. 
For the MAFR variable in the low institutional ownership percentage cases, the 
coefficients are negative. Yet for all the high ownership cases they are positive except for 
the cases of high and low based on zero with the control variables. In these two instances, 
MAFR has a positive coefficient of 0.0038471 attached to it in the low case and 0.000927 
attached to it in the high case. Moreover, the difference between the high institutional 
ownership cases and the low institutional ownership cases is not much. In both cases, all 
the variables are not significant, and there is only a slight difference between the positive 
and negative coefficients. Therefore, my hypothesis can be rejected and differs from 
existing literature. There is no evidence that good corporate governance in terms of high 
institutional ownership percentage in a firm can improve audit quality during a MAFR 
regime and compensate for the lack of independence flaw that the MAFR regime deals 
with. 
I am aware that my results are not easy to generalize in settings. The Arthur 
Andersen case is a peculiar one and does not truly represent a case of mandatory audit 
firm rotation, so my results are limited. Additionally, due to missing data, I was only able 
to use 117 firms in total, which is small sample size for generalizations. Rotation periods 
are usually seven to ten years. Since I only use five years of post MAFR data, my results 
may not accurately describe the rotation period effects on audit quality. Moreover, these 
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AA clients were not forced to change auditors after 2001 so it is not a true case of 
MAFR.  
VI. Conclusion 
This study addresses whether good corporate governance in terms of high 
institutional ownership percentage in a firm during a MAFR regime enhances audit 
quality. My findings suggest that there is no evidence that high institutional ownership 
percentage firms exhibit better audit quality during a MAFR regime. In short, the 
findings suggest that institutional ownership percentage in firms should not be used as a 
criterion for firms implementing MAFR. Despite the fact that MAFR in theory, and 
institutional ownership in reality, are both together and individually known to increase 
audit quality, they do not have a significant impact on it. Nevertheless, I acknowledge 
that my results may not be generalized because the AA scenario is not a true case of 
MAFR. 
There is a lack of evidence on the impact of MAFR on audit quality, and so 
regulators should be wary of its implementation. They should not rely on MAFR to 
achieve better audit quality and have other structures like good corporate governance, 
stricter regulations for audit and board committees in place to achieve higher audit 
quality. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Code Definition 
DACC_2 Discretionary accruals 
IO_PCT Percentage of shares held by institutions 
Totalassets_log The natural log of total assets 
MAFR*POST The interacting term between MAFR and 
Post. 
MAFR Indicates a 1 value if firms changed auditors 
from AA and 0 if they voluntarily changed 
auditors. 
POST Indicates a 1 value for years after 2001 
(2002-2006) and 0 if otherwise. 
Industryexpertornot Indicates 1 value if auditor firm is industry 
expert and 0 if otherwise.  
Highlow2001 Indicates 1 if institutional ownership % 
greater than 0.0436% and 0 if otherwise.  
Highlowbasedon0 Indicates 1 if institutional ownership % 
greater than 0% and 0 if otherwise. 
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TABLE 1: 
Descriptive statistical analysis of discretionary accruals, natural log of total assets and 
industry expert 
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TABLE 2: 
Regression results with the primary regression equation using low (1) and high (2) case 
based on median value and low (3) and high (4) case using 0 as the dividing point 
 (1) (2)        (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DACC_2 DACC_2 DACC_2 DACC_2 
     
MAFR -0.00297 0.00548 0.00385 0.000927 
 (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0155) (0.0203) 
POST 0.00270 0.0171 0.0214 0.00720 
 (0.0173) (0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0145) 
MAFR*POST -0.0149 -0.0236 -0.0245 -0.0281 
 (0.0244) (0.0252) (0.0214) (0.0287) 
totalassets_log -0.00689** -0.000372 -0.00772*** -0.00316 
 (0.00285) (0.00300) (0.00238) (0.00309) 
industryexpertornot 0.00848 0.00241 0.00801 0.00168 
 (0.0175) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0161) 
Constant 0.0463*** -0.0166 0.0415** 0.0101 
 (0.0163) (0.0197) (0.0164) (0.0182) 
     
Observations 550 570 490 630 
R-squared 0.021 0.003 0.034 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE 3: 
 Regression results without the controls while using low (1) and high (2) case based on 
median value and low (3) and high (4) case using 0 as the dividing point 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DACC_2 DACC_2 DACC_2 DACC_2 
     
MAFR -0.0211 0.00549 -0.0100 0.00178 
 (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0151) (0.0202) 
POST 0.000143 0.0169 0.0206 0.00566 
 (0.0174) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0144) 
MAFR*POST -0.0139 -0.0233 -0.0250 -0.0286 
 (0.0243) (0.0251) (0.0213) (0.0286) 
Constant 0.0206* -0.0181* 0.00412 -0.00536 
 (0.0123) (0.00968) (0.0116) (0.0102) 
     
Observations 550 570 490 630 
R-squared 0.011 0.003 0.013 0.003 
     
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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